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This paper discusses the role of foreign exchange interventions in the inflation-
targeting regime, focusing on the Czech experience since 1998. It concludes that 
the case for foreign exchange interventions is not clear in an inflation targeting 
regime both from the theoretical and empirical point of view.  
First, the stylised facts on the effectiveness of Czech interventions suggest that 
sometimes these might have had an effect lasting up to 2 or 3 months, but no 
strategy can be identified that would work in all episodes. Moreover, even many 
of the “successful” interventions were not able to prevent quite prolonged periods 
of exchange rate overvaluation in 1998 and in 2002. Second, the sterilisation 
costs of interventions are shown to have been quite substantial in the Czech 
Republic, which had in certain period affected their credibility and effectiveness. 
Third and most importantly, the interventions may lead to tensions with the 
philosophy of the inflation targeting regimes on the procedural and 
communication level, which might have a negative impact on the credibility of the 
policy regime.  
The paper proposes some criteria for assessing whether the interventions are not 
in conflict with the inflation targeting regime, and applies these criteria to the 
Czech case. From an ex post view, all the intervention episodes are judged to be 
consistent with the inflation targets and output developments, but there may be 
some doubt in other respects concerning the intervention episodes in early-1998 
and late-1999. 
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I. Introduction 
This  paper  discusses  the  role  of  foreign  exchange  interventions  in  the  inflation-targeting 
regime,  focusing  on  the  Czech  experience  since  1998.  It  does  not  aim  to  provide  an 
exhaustive analysis using econometric techniques, but rather to summarise the major stylised 
facts.  This  may  be  useful  on  several  grounds.  First,  the  Czech  National  Bank’s  (CNB’s) 
approach to managing the exchange rate float as part of the inflation targeting framework has 
gone through a process of evolution. It is thus important to ask where it stands at present, and 
what the policy recommendations should be if the CNB was supposed to face another period 
of exchange rate volatility in the future. Second, summarising the stylised facts may be a 
useful first step towards further research, including an econometric one. Third, the Czech 
experience may contribute as an important case study to the growing international literature 
on managed floating, and in particular combining it with the inflation targeting framework. 
The operational issues of the foreign exchange interventions are an important aspect of this 
debate. Finally, there may also be some lessons for the future membership in the ERM II 
mechanism, in which foreign exchange interventions are likely to gain on importance.   
I discuss the direct interventions only. It must be noted that verbal interventions are also used 
frequently by many central banks including the CNB to influence the exchange rates. I believe 
that the verbal interventions should follow broadly similar principles that I propose in this 
paper for assessing the appropriateness within the policy regime for the direct interventions. 
There is one natural difference, of course, in terms of communication openness, as the verbal 
interventions are by definition public and fairly transparent (at least provided that the “do-not-
lie” principle is observed), while the direct interventions might be more secretive (see below). 
The paper is organised as follows. After a brief theoretical introduction in section II, the 
current monetary policy framework of the CNB is explained briefly in section III. Section IV 
describes the exchange rate developments in this regime. Section V presents the major policy 
steps in the exchange rate management.  Section VI summarizes some stylised facts on the 
effectiveness of the foreign exchange interventions are summarized. Section VII analyses the 
sterilisation costs of the intervention policies. Finally, the consistency of the interventions 
with  inflation  targeting  is  discussed  in  Sections  VIII  and  IX.  Section  X  summarises  and 
concludes.  
 
II. Some Theoretical Background 
In the past, exchange rate pegs used to be very popular as the anchor of monetary policy. This 
automatically  meant  an  important  role  for  foreign  exchange  interventions  among  the 
instruments of central banks pursuing exchange rate pegs. A bit more controversial was the 
use  of  foreign  exchange  interventions  among  the  major  floating  currencies.  These 
interventions were sometimes carried out, occasionally even in a co-ordinated manner (such 
as in 1985), but the theoretical and empirical arguments on their desirability and effectiveness 
have been inconclusive (see Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Schwartz, 2000). The only mainstream 
consensus  that  emerged,  and  has  in  fact  survived  since  that  period,  is  that  non-sterilised 
interventions are more effective then the sterilised ones, if the latter can achieve anything at 
all (see Rogoff, 1984; Schwartz, 2000).  
The traditional arguments in favour of the sterilised interventions’ effectiveness have included 
the  signalling  channel  (Mussa,  1981)  and  portfolio-balance  channel  (see  Branson,  1976; 
Kouri, 1976; Edison, 1993), but most empirical analyses that were carried out during the 
1980s did not support the quantitative importance of these channels. There are some more 
recent econometric studies, though, which benefited from better data availability since the  3  
1990s, supporting the effectiveness of the traditional channels of sterilised interventions (see 
Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Kearns and Rigobon, 2002). On the theoretical front, the case 
for sterilised interventions has been also strengthened by the order-flow channel (“market 
microstructure”) literature (see Lyons, 1997; Peires, 1997; Popper and Montgomery, 2001). 
Finally, some authors have argued that the interventions’ effectiveness may be greater in the 
developing and transition economies compared with the advanced countries whose data have 
been typically used in the empirical analyses (Canales-Kriljenko, 2003). 
In any case, the ongoing liberalisation of capital flows and numerous currency crises during 
the  1990s  have  changed  the  world’s  map  in  terms  of  the  exchange  rate  regimes.  Most 
importantly, they have led to a more cautious approach to fixed exchange rates. The “bipolar 
view” has emerged in the economic literature as the mainstream opinion on exchange rate 
regimes.
1 While many countries have in the recent decade or two moved to floating exchange 
rates,  some  other  economies  have  adopted  currency  boards,  dollarized/euroized  their 
economies, or formed monetary unions (see Fischer, 2001).
 On the contrary, the number of 
countries with intermediate exchange rate regimes (“soft pegs”), which are now viewed as 
inherently unstable, has declined significantly. 
Within  the  group  of  those  countries  that  choose,  for  one  reason  or  another,  to  pursue 
independent monetary policy with a large degree of exchange rate flexibility, the inflation 
targeting  has  been  rapidly  increasing  its  “market  share”  since  the  1990s.  As  reported  by 
Mahadeva and Stern (2000), 54 countries in the world had an explicit inflation target in 1998, 
of which 11 had it as a sole policy goal. And since then, many other countries have joined the 
club, or have been thinking about that possibility seriously (see e.g. Truman, 2003). As part of 
this trend, the number of small open economies that operate the inflation targeting regime has 
grown substantially. For these countries, it is a crucial question what approach should the 
central bank use to deal with possibly large exchange rate fluctuations under the inflation 
targeting. Their economies may be quite vulnerable to exchange rate shocks and may thus 
exhibit a “fear of floating” (Calvo, Reinhart, 2000). We thus need to ask to what extent a 
central bank pursuing the inflation targeting should use foreign exchange interventions, i.e. 
whether it should let the exchange rate float freely or try to manage the float to some extent.  
The theory of inflation targeting (see e.g. Svensson, 1998; 1999) gives quite a clear answer. In 
most models, it is assumed that the exchange rate behaves according to the uncovered interest 
rate parity (UIP). In other words, it is assumed that perfect arbitrage exists in the liberalised 
foreign exchange markets. The elasticity of short-term capital flows to yield differentials is 
believed to be infinitely high. There is thus no use trying to influence the supply or demand of 
foreign  exchange,  because  all  central  bank’s  interventions  would  be  countervailed  by  an 
equally strong flow of private capital in the opposite direction. On the other hand, interest rate 
changes should be very effective in influencing the exchange rate.  
To be less strict, one may argue that even with the UIP the central bank might be able to 
affect  the  current  exchange  rate  with  foreign  exchange  interventions  by  influencing  the 
market expectations on the future exchange rate path, or by influencing the risk premium. The 
transmission mechanism between interventions and the exchange rate is, however, likely to be 
very  uncertain  and  unstable  in  such  a  world,  implying  a  great  difficulty  in  using  the 
interventions as a systematic monetary policy tool. Moreover, it is not clear, whether the same 
signal cannot be sent by the central bank in another way, which would be more consistent 
with the inflation targeting framework (see Svensson, 2001). The theory of inflation targeting 
thus  typically  assumes,  or  even  recommends,  a  purely  floating  exchange  rate.  The  only 
                                                            
1 Although a mainstream view, it is by far not consensual. Williamson (2000) is one of the examples arguing in 
favour of the intermediate options (the so-called “basket, band and crawl” system).   4  
instrument that the central bank then has is its short-term interest rate. To the extent that the 
exchange rate fluctuations influence the targeted inflation rate and the output gap, interest 
rates are used to respond to the exchange rate shocks. Their changes are transmitted to the 
economy both through the interest rate and exchange rate channels.  
Nevertheless, some recent literature has started to argue in favour of managing the floating 
exchange rate as part of the inflation targeting regime (Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser, 2001; 
Goldstein, 2002; Truman, 2003).
2 Moreover, it is a matter of fact that some of the inflation-
targeting countries do use foreign exchange interventions more or less frequently.
3 This is in 
line  with  a  general  observation  that  the  de  facto  practice  often  differs  from  the  declared 
exchange rate strategies, typically in the direction of tighter management (Calvo and Reinhart, 
2000).  There  is  thus  not  a  general  consensus  on  the  “fall  of  foreign  exchange  market 
intervention as a policy tool” (Schwartz, 2000).  
Besides the disagreement on whether to use the interventions or not, we also lack generally 
recognised  best  practices  on  the  procedural  and  operational  issues  for  the  interventions 
policies, in spite of some recent attempts to establish these (see Canales-Kriljenko, et al., 
2003).  This  may  often  create  challenges  for  the  central  banks  that  can  not  resist  being 
occasionally unfaithful to the inflation targeting literature and pure floating.  
 
III. The Czech Republic – Historical Background and Policy Regime  
The  Czech  Republic  belongs  to  the  cases  that  try  to  combine  inflation  targeting  with  a 
managed float. The aim of this paper is to provide a case study of the so-far Czech experience, 
as well as to contribute to the debate on the best intervention practices, focusing specifically 
on the inflation targeting regime. But before doing so, let me first briefly describe the general 
characteristics of the CNB‘s monetary policy regime. The Czech situation has some specific 
characteristics that are useful to understand before moving on to discuss the exchange rate 
management issues (see also Hrn￿í￿ and Šmídková, 1998).  
First, the inflation-targeting regime was introduced in the Czech Republic in late-1997 after 
an enforced floating of the exchange rate in May 1997, which ended the period of a fixed 
exchange rate regime introduced at the beginning of economic transition.
4 At that time, the 
economy and market expectations were destabilised due to the economic overheating of the 
mid-1990s,  currency  depreciation  after  a  currency  turmoil,  increased  speed  of  price 
deregulations  in  early-1998,  pro-cyclical  fiscal  policies,  etc.  In  contrast  to  the  advanced 
countries, the inflation targeting regime was designed as a strategy of disinflation – not just 
maintaining low inflation – after a turbulent period.     
Second, the Czech Republic was the first transition country to adopt inflation targeting. The 
range of transition-specific issues includes, among other things, the challenges of the long-run 
convergence  and  trend  real  exchange  rate  appreciation,  sharp  volatility  of  foreign  capital 
flows
5, gradual – but often not smooth – decline in the risk premium over time, and so on. At 
the same time, the Czech Republic has a high share of volatile items in its consumer basket, 
                                                            
2 Goldstein (2002), for example, argues in favour of a “managed floating plus“ system, in which the managed 
floating is supplemented with inflation targeting as a nominal anchor and with financial stability policies. In my 
opinion, it would be better to call this monetary policy regime “inflation targeting plus”, because I view the 
inflation targeting as the principal anchor and the other two aspects as its supplements.  
3 Most recently, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has joined this club. 
4 The Czech experience thus fits into the global trend of moving from soft pegs to the corner exchange rate 
regimes as a response to increased capital mobility and currency crises of the 1990s.  
5 One can identify two major waves of foreign capital inflows. The first one was primarily driven by short-term 
capital and took place in 1994-1996. The second one, peaking in 2002, was caused mainly by the FDIs.      5  
implying larger cost-driven shocks to its inflation compared with the advanced countries.
6  
These are factors that have influenced the inflationary and exchange rate developments, and 
thus also central bank policies.  
Third, the Czech Republic is a very open economy. This makes it potentially more vulnerable 
to exogenous and exchange rate shocks. The exports of goods and services reach 65 % of the 
GDP (imports are 67 % of GDP), meaning that the demand transmission channel as well as 
the supply-side channel of the exchange rate are potentially quite significant. At the same 
time, the share of imported goods in the consumer basket is estimated at around 25 % (see 
Beneš, et al., 2003), implying a strong direct price channel of exchange rate transmission.   
All the above factors contributed to the fact that the CNB’s record in terms of hitting the 
announced inflation targets has been quite poor so far. In particular, the CNB undershot its 
targets for net inflation in all the first three years from 1998 to 2000 (see Figure 1), hitting the 
target in December 2001 only.
7 The sharp disinflation in this period was primarily a result of 
an unexpected decline in food and oil prices during 1998-99, combined with a surprising 
exchange rate appreciation in 1998 and an economic recession in 1997-98. Similarly, the 
headline inflation was below the announced target range from mid-2002 till early-2004 (see 
Figure 1). Among the factors that have caused this development one can point to important 
exogenous  price  shocks,  but  exchange  rate  appreciation  and  a  negative  output  gap  have 
played a role in this episode as well.     
 
Figure 1: Czech Inflation: Actual vs. Targets 
Source: Czech Statistical Office 
 
The  biggest  achievement  is  a  stabilisation  of  inflation  expectations  at  low  levels  and  the 
credibility of the monetary policy regime, which has been gained despite the frequent target 
misses. Credibility has been facilitated by  a gradual evolution of the regime (longer-term 
orientation, switch to headline inflation targeting, and so on) in response to the accumulated 
                                                            
6 The share of foodstuffs in the basket is around 28 %, regulated prices 18 % and fuels about 5 %.   
















































































targets 6  
experience and changing situation. A high degree of transparency, which has been achieved in 
monetary policy and other areas of the CNB’s activities, is crucial for the credibility as well. 
 
IV. Exchange Rate Developments  
In this section, I briefly describe the exchange rate developments of the Czech crown (CZK). 
Figure 2 shows the CZK’s monthly nominal and real effective exchange rate, based both on 
CPI and PPI, since 1993. 
 



















Source: Czech National Bank  
 
As one can see, the real effective exchange rate has exhibited an appreciating trend over the 
whole period since 1993 (both in CPI and PPI terms), regardless of the exchange rate regime 
changes. Before 2001, the real appreciation was mainly driven by an inflation differential, 
since then is has gone through strengthening of the nominal exchange rate. The appreciating 
trend  might  be  explained  by  a  combination  of  several  factors,  including  the  Balassa-
Samuelson effect, terms-of-trade gains, deregulations of administered prices, etc. (see e.g. 
Halpern  and  Wyplosz,  2001;  ￿ihák  and  Holub,  2003).  It  can  thus  be  considered  an 
equilibrium phenomenon unless it exceeds some “reasonable” speed. This speed is, however, 
difficult to determine precisely, as only some of its factors can be quantified relatively easily 
(most  analyses  focus  on  the  Balassa-Samuelson  effect  only).  A  challenge  potentially 
stemming from this real trend is that it may co-ordinate the exchange rate expectations in one 
direction, i.e. towards appreciation.
8 The price convergence process may also contribute to 
excess volatility of the exchange rate if the market expectations concerning the long-run trend 
change substantially over time. It is moreover difficult to find an appropriate monetary policy 
response  to  such  developments  if  the  central  bank  is  itself  fairly  uncertain  on  what  the 
equilibrium real exchange rate might be.    
                                                            
8 It might thus be one alternative explanation why the interventions have been biased towards purchases of 
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Figure 2 also shows that the medium-term volatility of both the nominal and real exchange 
rate has increased substantially since the exchange rate’s fluctuation band was widened in 
February 1996, and abolished in May 1997. The CZK has experienced two waves of rather 
sharp  appreciations  in  recent  years,  which  were  only  with  some  time  lag  followed  with 
depreciations to (or below) the trend level. The first one took place in 1998, when the CZK 
appreciated above its pre-floating level, in spite of the crises in Russia and Latin America. 
The second, and more pronounced one, started in 2001 and lasted till late-2002. Although 
these two periods were both affected by other strong external influences, it is probably more 
than a coincidence that both these two cases were marked with sub-trend economic growth 
and undershooting of the CNB’s inflation targets (see section III). 
The short-term volatility is summarised in Figure 3 by a moving 60-day standard deviation of 
the CZK/EUR exchange rate both in absolute level and daily percentage changes. From this 
figure, one can see that the short-run volatility of the exchange rate was, as expected, greatest 
in the turbulent year 1997, but was also fairly high throughout 1998 and early 1999. After 
stabilising at quite modest levels since mid-1999, another increase in the short-term volatility 
was observed during the appreciation episode of 2002, even though its magnitude remained – 
perhaps a bit surprisingly – well below the previous peaks.
9    
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V. Management of the Exchange Rate  
When the floating exchange rate was introduced in May 1997, it was announced that the 
exchange rate regime would be a managed float, the DEM (EUR at present) serving as a 
reference currency. The CNB thus retained the possibility to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market “in the event of excessive volatility or unjustified exchange rate trends”. This section 
summarizes the CNB’s policy measures responding to the exchange rate developments.  
In line with the announced managed floating policy, the CNB intervened occasionally in the 
foreign exchange market. With the exception of the turbulent  year 1997 (which does not 
                                                            
9 The short-term volatility of the CZK’s exchange rate is analysed econometrically in Bulí￿ (2003).   8  
belong  to  the  period  of  inflation  targeting),  though,  the  interventions  de  facto  always 
concerned purchases of foreign exchange to slow down the exchange rate appreciation (see 
Figure 4).
10 It might be questioned, of course, if this asymmetry in the interventions does not 
represent a departure from floating exchange rate, signalling that the central bank has been 
trying to influence the exchange rate trend rather than just respond to volatility, which should 
go both ways. I address this issue in section VIII. 
 
Figure 4: The Foreign Exchange Interventions (spot) 
Source: Czech National Bank  
 
The periods of high intervention activity were typically followed by quite long periods of no 
interventions. The most active periods were (i) February 1998 - July 1998; (ii) October 1999 - 
March  2000;  and  (iii)  October  2001  -  September  2002.  In  the  first  and  third  case,  this 
coincided with the periods of fast nominal effective exchange rate appreciation (Figure 2), 
which peaked above 15 %  year-on-year.  It  also coincided with periods of relatively high 
short-term volatility of the exchange rate (Figure 3). In the second case, the CZK appreciated 
against the EUR, but it depreciated quite strongly against the USD at the same time, due to the 
EUR/USD exchange rate developments. As a result, there was no strong nominal effective 
exchange rate appreciation (Figure 2). This might be interpreted as an indirect ‘confirmation’ 
of the euro’s reference-currency role in the Czech managed floating. 
Besides the direct interventions in foreign exchange market, the CNB has also adopted other 
measures  responding  to  the  exchange  rate  developments.  A  special  account  for  the 
government’s foreign exchange privatisation revenues was established at the CNB in early-
2000, which has been intended to reduce the exchange rate impact of large privatisation sales. 
This step was explained by the fact that massive privatisations represented a one-off influence 
on the exchange rate driven by the government’s actions, which might distort the market 
equilibrium. From this point of view, it has been regarded by the CNB as justifiable to offset 
this influence with a co-ordinated non-standard action of the authorities. 
                                                            
10 In 2004 the CNB has started selling earning on its FX reserves to prevent them from growing further (see the 
end of data sample in Figure 4). This step, however, has not been intended as a monetary policy measure, but as 



















































































































. 9  
An  important  aspect  of  this  privatisation  account  has  been  facilitating  of  communication 
between the CNB and government on the exchange rate issues. Apart from this positive role, 
however, the effectiveness of the account was limited till 2001 by the fact that the government 
never  kept  its  privatisation  revenues  on  the  account  for  long,  as  it  needed  the  money  to 
improve the weak fiscal situation. Facing the largest privatisation sales to come (electricity, 
gas, telecommunications etc.), which were cited by the market participants as the main reason 
for the exchange rate appreciation in late-2001, the CNB and the government reached an 
agreement in January 2002. This agreement has kept all of the government’s foreign exchange 
revenues out of the market and at the same time allowed financing the fiscal needs out of 
privatisation revenues. Direct purchases of the government’s foreign exchange revenues by 
the  CNB  have  been  the  most  important  element  of  the  agreement.  So  far,  the  CNB  has 
purchased over EUR 4.2 billion from the state. Besides that, a decision was taken to postpone 
any issues of the government’s eurobonds, an aim was intensified to match public foreign 
exchange revenues and outlays (and to match the foreign exchange assets with liabilities), etc. 
It is also important to keep in mind that the interventions can not be viewed in isolation from 
changes in the main monetary policy instrument, i.e. the short-term interest rates. The Czech 
nominal interest rates were on a declining trend since the introduction of inflation targeting, 
with an exception of three minor interest rate hikes so far (by 0.25 % in March 1998, July 
2001 and June 2004), The first period of interest rate cuts started in July 1998 and lasted till 
late-1999.  It  thus  de  facto  followed  the  first  wave  of  foreign  exchange  interventions 
(coinciding with it in July 1998 only), and its last stage coincided with the beginning of the 
second intervention wave. Another period of interest rate cuts started in November 2001 and 
went  on  till  mid-2003,  thus  coinciding  with  (and  extending  beyond)  the  last  episode  of 
intervention activity.   
 
VI. Stylised Facts on the Effectiveness of Exchange Rate Management  
It would require a detailed econometric analysis to judge whether and to what extent the 
foreign exchange interventions and other policy measures were effective in influencing the 
exchange rate developments. Moreover, one would need to analyse not only what actually 
happened after the interventions, but also compare this to what would have happened without 
them (i.e. to know the counterfactual). This is however extremely difficult to do, not least 
because we lack a reliable model describing the short-run dynamics of the exchange rates. It 
would  also  be  necessary  to  study  in  detail  the  microstructure  of  the  CZK’s  market  (see 
Derviz, 2003 for such an analysis), which goes beyond the scope of this paper. I thus limit 
myself to a discussion of some stylised facts. These are summarized in Table 1.    
In some cases, the interventions seem to have had a visible immediate impact on the exchange 
rate. A typical example is March 2000, when interventions of slightly less than EUR 400 
million took place. The exchange rate depreciated almost by 2 % and remained at a weaker 
level till mid-2000. Another similar case is February-April 1998, even though this time the  
weakening of the CZK was more short-lived (till the beginning of May 1998) in spite of a 
relatively high volume of interventions. In October 1999, the interventions reached almost 
EUR 1 billion, and the exchange rate depreciated by more than 3 %, and remained weaker till 
mid-December 1999. In some other situations, though, the impact was much less clear. For 
example  in  June  -  July  1998,  the  CNB  bought  about  EUR  500  million,  but  the  crown 
depreciated only with some lag, which coincided with the break-out of the Russian crisis. 
There were even cases in which the short-term impact of interventions was quite weak and 
non-lasting,  such  as  in  December  1999  or  in  late-2001  (even  though  it  may  be  true  that 
without these interventions the exchange rate might have went on appreciating further).   10
The immediate impact of the interventions thus looks quite uncertain, but occasionally might 
last up to 2 or 3 months according to the Czech experience. No particular “ideal” intervention 
strategy (e.g. open vs. undisclosed; large vs. smaller; etc.) can be identified at first sight, 
though. Something that did work in one situation may have had little effect in another one. 
Moreover, even many of the “successful” interventions were not able to prevent relatively 
prolonged periods of exchange rate overvaluation in 1998 or in 2002 (see section IV). A key 
issue  for  the  effectiveness  seems  to  be  how  the  interventions  interact  with  the  market 
expectations, which may be very different in different periods. This is, unfortunately, quite 
hard to tell before an intervention is actually carried out; and the term “market expectations” 
may  in  fact  serve  just  as  an  ex-post  explanation  for  the  previous  predictions  on  the 
interventions’ effectiveness having gone wrong. 
 








CZK/EUR (ECU prior to 1999) 
















02/1998  04/1998  1285  37,87  38,50  38,37  36,30  36,46  36,11  35,11 
06/1998  07/1998  508  36,95  36,11  36,49  34,35  34,35  35,47  35,17 
10/1999  10/1999  966  36,52  36,36  35,72  35,68  36,62  36,40  36,03 
12/1999  12/1999  229  36,36  36,40  36,08  35,83  36,13  36,03  35,60 
03/2000  03/2000  394  36,05  35,71  35,65  35,53  35,63  36,31  36,02 
10/2001  01/2002  643  33,86  34,19  33,91  31,46  31,92  31,79  30,36 
04/2002  04/2002  1 009  32,08  31,39  30,62  30,06  30,63  30,56  29,75 
07/2002  09/2002  954  30,36  30,30  29,25  28,97  30,30  30,65  31,19 
Source: Czech National Bank 
 
As concerns the most recent experience in late-2001 and during 2002, it fits rather well into 
this picture. When the exchange rate started to appreciate abruptly in the second half of 2001 
(see  Figure  2  in  section  IV),  it  was  usually  being  attributed  by  analysts  and  market 
participants to expectations of future foreign exchange privatisation revenues. The CNB tried 
to  resist  this  tendency  with  foreign  exchange  interventions  in  October  2001  (EUR  240 
million) and December 2001 (EUR 100 million). At the same time, from October 2001 the 
CNB had signalled to the market its intention to reach an agreement with the government on 
the privatisation revenues. Nevertheless, the market seemed to be discounting this information 
heavily, and the expectations remained biased towards appreciation. When the agreement was 
approved on 16 January 2002, it had surprisingly little effect on the market, even though its 
mechanisms  were  quite  strong  (unprecedented)  and  removed  the  major  alleged  source  of 
appreciation.
12  The  major  explanation  for  the  continued  strengthening  shifted  from  the 
privatisation revenues to the long-run real appreciation trend of the Czech crown.  
                                                            
11 To get a feeling of the relative scope of the CNB’s interventions, note that the average daily turnover in the 
CZK foreign exchange market was about USD 700-800 million (EUR 800-820 million) in 2002. The Czech 
yearly GDP is roughly equivalent to EUR 75 billion. 
12 The minutes of the 21 January extraordinary Board meeting state: “The rapid strengthening of the koruna 
observed at the end of 2001 was primarily linked to the anticipation of converting a significant part of the state’s 
foreign exchange incomes into Czech koruna. It was stated that considering the extent of the approved measures 
(i.e the agreement with the government), the exchange rate was likely to shift back to a level corresponding to   11
Therefore, the CNB Board held an extraordinary meeting on 21 January 2002, at which it 
decided to carry out open foreign exchange interventions (altogether EUR 305 million in 
January 2002) and an interest rate cut of 0.25 % points. The CZK weakened by slightly less 
than 1.5 % on that day, but was back to its pre-intervention level in four days and continued 
strengthening at an even accelerated pace till the beginning of April 2002. On 4 April, the 
CNB thus started to openly intervene again. Overall, the volume of interventions reached 
EUR 1 billion during April 2002. The exchange rate ended this month where it stood at its 
beginning  (see  Table  1),  which  was  perhaps  a  bit  disappointing  result  given  the  high 
intervention volume, even though the appreciation tendency was at least halted till late-June 
2002. This experience suggests that even relatively large interventions may have a modest 
effect at best when the market expectations are set in one direction and the central bank tries 
to “lean against the wind”. 
Nevertheless,  the  “undisclosed”  interventions  that  the  CNB  used  in  July-September  2002 
(together  roughly  EUR  1  billion)  seem  to  have  had  an  important  effect.  The  CZK/EUR 
exchange rate ended the year 9 % weaker compared to its all-time high of 10 July 2002, and 
remained relatively weak in 2003 as well. The apparent effectiveness of these interventions 
can be explained by a combination of several factors. These included: (i) a change in the 
market expectations, supported by some adverse macroeconomic news; (ii) negative interest 
rate differential, making the CZK less attractive for investors; (iii) change in the market’s 
perception on the sterilisation costs after the interest rate differential became negative; (iv) 
implementation of the agreement with the government in practice, combined with delays in 
further privatisation.  
The changed market expectations were probably the most important factor. Once the market 
expectations ceased to be skewed towards appreciation and the one-sided bets became less 
interesting due to a combination of zero interest rate differential with more exchange rate 
uncertainty, it was perhaps a matter of time only when some negative  fundamental news 
would initiate a correction. And to the extent that the policy measures (interest rate cuts, 
interventions and the agreement) contributed to this change, we can say that they might have 
had a medium-term impact on the exchange rate. This medium-term effect was – perhaps 
surprisingly  –  stronger  than  the  immediate  impact.  This  highlights  the  signalling  role  of 
foreign exchange interventions as opposed to their “market-equilibrating” effect. At the same 
time, it is very difficult to assess the contribution of interventions in isolation from other 
factors and policy steps (such as interest rate changes), and it is therefore not possible to 
arrive at a clearly positive judgement on their role in the Czech inflation targeting framework.  
On balance, the Czech experience does not shed too much light on the inconclusive debate on 
the interventions’ effectiveness, and both critics and supporters of the interventions can find 
their favourite bits in the overall evidence. Nonetheless, it is fair to note that the apparent 
instability of transmission between the interventions and their outcomes casts a serious doubt 
on the possibility to use them more systematically as a policy instrument under the inflation 
targeting regime.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the economic fundamentals. However, the exchange rate did not react in this way, and as a result, monetary 
conditions were disproportionately tightened.” (see www.cnb.cz)    12
VII. Sterilisation Costs   
It  is  widely  accepted  that  the  monetary  policy  goals  must  not  be  subordinated  to  profit 
considerations.  Nonetheless,  when  considering  the  use  of  foreign  exchange  interventions, 
which are supposed to be a complementary policy instrument at best, and are not crucial for 
achieving the main goal of long-run price stability, the sterilisation costs should be taken into 
account. This section presents a simple estimate of these costs for the Czech Republic.   
The foreign exchange interventions and purchases from the government within the special 
agreement have resulted in a growth of the CNB’s foreign exchange reserves. The volume of 
foreign exchange reserves was growing rapidly during the period of fixed exchange rate and 
fast capital inflows till 1996. After declining during 1997, they started to grow gradually 
again  due  to  the  occasional  interventions  from  1998  till  early-2000.  Since  late-2001,  the 
reserves have increased considerably, though, to over EUR 22 billion (CZK 700 billion). 
This has import implications for the structure of the CNB’s balance sheet, and consequently 
for its financial results. The volume of foreign exchange reserves exceeds the currency in 
circulation  almost  3-times.  The  liquidity  is  sterilised  using  reverse  repo  operations,  the 
volume  of  sterilisation  reaching  about  CZK  480  billion  at  present.  This  means  that  the 
“sterilisation costs” may be substantial compared with the monetary income (seigniorage) the 
CNB can earn due to its monopoly to issue currency. Indeed, there are accumulated losses 
from the past in the CNB’s books that reached CZK 72 billion at the end of 2003.
13 
The overall sterilisation costs (SC) can be estimated as a difference between the CZK yield on 
net foreign exchange reserves and the yield the central bank could earn by investing the same 
amount of money in the domestic money market (or by reducing the volume of reverse repo 





d denotes the domestic interest rate, i
f foreign interest rate, e percentage exchange rate 
depreciation, and FXR (net) foreign exchange reserves.
14 Large net foreign exchange reserves 
mean that the central bank is exposed to exchange rate losses/gains due to exchange rate 
appreciations/depreciations, making the central bank’s profits quite volatile. Another part of 
the  sterilisation  costs  is  given  by  the  interest  rate  differential  between  the  domestic  and 
foreign interest rates. 
Table 2 shows an estimate of the CNB’s sterilization costs calculated in line with the above 
mentioned equation for the period of 1993-2003.
15 As we can see, the estimated sterilisation 
costs  were  increasing  from  1993  to  1996.  The  central  bank  accumulated  more  and  more 
foreign exchange reserves, which were to a large extent being sterilised by issuing the CNB’s 
treasury bills that had to pay a higher interest rate than the foreign exchange reserves were 
earning. In 1996, in addition, the costs of foreign exchange reserves were increased by an 
                                                            
13  These  accumulated  losses,  however,  do  not  reflect  the  sterilisation  costs  only,  but  also  past  quasi-fiscal 
operations of the central bank, such as its involvement in the clean-ups of ailing banks (Holub, 2001) or the cost 
of federation split-up. These transformation costs alone had the same order as the CNB’s accumulated loss.  
14 This is a very rough estimate only, as it embodies a very strong ceteris paribus assumption. For example, it 
ignores the effects of sterilisation policies on the domestic interest rates, macroeconomic developments, fiscal 
financing costs, etc. For a more detailed discussion of the sterilisation costs, see Holub (2001).  
15 For the period since 1997, I used the interest earnings and exchange rate gains/losses on the CNB’s foreign 
exchange reserves that were stated in its annual reports. For the earlier period, I approximated these earnings and 
gains/losses only. I used a weighted average of short-term money market interest rates in Germany (65 %) and 
the USA (35 %) as a proxy for foreign interest rates, and weighted percentage changes of the CZK’s exchange 
rate against the DEM (65 %) and USD (35 %) to calculate the exchange rate gains/losses. I used the CNB’s two-
week repo-rate (and 2W PRIBOR for the period before 1996) as the domestic interest rate.   13
appreciation of the exchange rate within its widened fluctuation band. Since 1997, i.e. under 
the floating, the estimated costs have been very volatile due to exchange rate changes, but 
were still negative on average. As a result, the total sum of these costs since 1993 has reached 
about CZK 190 billion. In terms of the net present value in 2003, the figure is even higher – 
around CZK 240 billion, equivalent to 10 % of yearly GDP.  
We  can  thus  see  that  the  CNB’s  sterilisation  costs  have  indeed  had  a  strong  empirical 
relevance, even though the computations presented here are only a rough measure of these 
costs based on many simplifications (for detail see Holub, 2004). These financial costs of 
interventions should be taken into account – and compared with the expected macroeconomic 
benefits  –  when  discussing  the  exchange  rate  management,  swinging  the  balance  further 
towards being faithful to the pure floating.   
It should be also mentioned that the sterilisation costs may have important implications for the 
effectiveness of interventions, as the Czech experience illustrates. They may undermine the 
interventions’ credibility in those circumstances when the sterilisation costs are potentially 
high, which might further increase them, as unsuccessful interventions tend to be more costly 
than the successful ones (there is thus a self-fulfilling element in the interventions’ financial 
credibility).
16 If the financial credibility is low, it might be helpful to strengthen it by making 
the interventions more sustainable. For example, the CNB’s agreement with the government 
has included as its crucial part the government’s participation on sterilisation costs incurred 
by the CNB due to the direct purchases of public foreign exchange revenues. This provision 
has  made  the  agreement  financially  sustainable  for  the  CNB,  and  thus  more  credible. 
Similarly, the credibility of the CNB’s foreign exchange interventions increased when the 
interest-rate differential vis-à-vis eurozone became negative, which led to the interventions 
being viewed as profitable by the market.  
 
Table 2: Estimated "Sterilisation Costs" (CZK billion) 
(CZK billion)  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Net foreign assets   24  112  248  342  359  378  439  488  510  630  706 
Domestic int. rate (%)  11,1  8,6  10,9  12  14  13,8  6,6  5,3  5,1  3,5  2,2 
Foreign int. rate (%)   5,9  4,9  5  4  4  4,1  3,5  5,1  5,5  4,3  2,9 
ER gains/losses   -0,3  0  0,2  -8,6  44,7  -35,6  31,8  -3,5  -40,1  -26,2  -29,8 
Estimated SC  -1,6  -4,1  -14,5  -36,1  8,6  -72,1  18,5  -4,4  -38,1  -20,9  -25,3 
Source: Czech National Bank; own computations 
 
VIII. Consistency of Interventions with Inflation Targeting 
The authors who propose supplementing inflation targeting with managed floating typically 
assume implicitly that this can be done quite easily, without adverse consequences for the 
credibility of the monetary policy regime. Nonetheless, there is abundant experience showing 
that trying to “chase two rabbits” with monetary policy can be very harmful for credibility. 
And this possibility can not be dismissed simply by claiming that this danger does not apply 
for managed floating in which no exchange rate goal is announced.  
                                                            
16 Note that this credibility aspect is exactly opposite to what has been suggested by Mussa (1981). He has 
argued  that  the  possibility  of  central  bank’s  losses  is  positive  for  credibility,  because  it  can  work  as  a 
commitment  device.  In  our  case,  it  was  the  reduction  of  the  possible  losses  that  helped,  by  causing  the 
interventions to be viewed as financially sustainable.    14
There  is  no  generally  accepted  set  of  criteria  for  assessing  if  the  foreign  exchange 
interventions  are  not  in  conflict  with  the  inflation-targeting  regime  (besides  the  orthodox 
belief that their are inconsistent with the inflation targeting by definition). I thus propose some 
simple criteria myself and then assess how the CNB past interventions perform on these. The 
consistency with the inflation targeting may be assessed on three levels: 
1)  Target consistency: The exchange rate policy should not be in conflict with (or preferably 
be supportive for) achieving the policy goals of inflation targeting. The supplementary 
monetary policy tool (i.e. interventions) should not send confusing signals compared with 
the main one (interest rates). The primary goal should be the inflation target, and without 
compromising it the  central bank may  also take into account stabilisation of the real 
economy if the inflation targeting is interpreted in a flexible manner (which, I believe, is 
the Czech case). Interventions against appreciation/depreciation are target-consistent only 
when  the  inflation  forecast  points  below/above  target  and/or  the  output  gap  is 
negative/positive.  In  other  words,  they  should  be  limited  to  cases  when  a  monetary 
easing/tightening is consistent with the inflation targeting. 
2)  Regime  consistency:  The  use  of  interventions  should  not  be  in  conflict  with  the 
underlying philosophy of inflation targeting. This includes the belief that the central bank 
can  not  systematically  follow  policies  that  are  not  consistent  with  free  international 
capital  mobility  (the  “impossible  trinity”).  The  central  bank  does  not  have  two 
independent policy instruments, i.e. it can not choose the mix of monetary conditions at 
its will. In particular, the foreign exchange interventions should not push against the UIP 
logic.  They  should  be  rather  viewed  as  an  attempt  to  restore  the  UIP  relationship  in 
periods of exchange rate disturbances that are causing inflation target undershooting and 
macroeconomic  instability.  On  the  practical  level,  this  criterion  can  be  assessed  by 
looking  at  the  monetary  conditions  developments.  For  interventions  against 
appreciation/depreciation to be regime-consistent the exchange rate should be judged as 
seriously overvalued/undervalued in comparison with the fundamentals and the interest 
rate parity, or moving in that direction quickly. At the same time, interest rates should be 
relaxed/tight and/or declining/rising, reflecting that the primary tool has been used in line 
with the inflation targeting. As a result, interventions against appreciation/depreciation 
should be considered mostly in those situations in which the mix of monetary conditions 
includes  a  loose/tight  interest  rate  component  and  tight/loose  (and/or  quickly 
appreciating) exchange rate component.  
3)  Procedural  consistency:  The  procedures  governing  the  interventions  –  such  as  the 
decision-making rules, communication to the public, etc. – should be consistent with the 
constraints imposed on the interest rate decision-making under the inflation targeting. 
To make sure, I do not suggest that these criteria should be adhered to rigidly when deciding 
on the interventions. There may be specific circumstances that are not encompassed very well 
by  the  proposed  criteria.  For  instance,  the  central  bank  may  wish  to  react  to  short-term 
volatility of the exchange rate and/or disorderly market conditions as a pre-emptive measure 
to  reduce  the  probability  of  running  into  a  situation  described  in  the  above  consistency-
criteria. Another example (specific to transition economies) might be a presence of large and 
volatile privatisation revenues, such as in the Czech Republic. In these cases, an action of the 
central  bank,  such  as  “technical”  interventions  to  sustain  market  liquidity  or  the  Czech 
agreement on the privatisation revenues, might be justified. Personally, though, I would view 
these instances as exceptions from the above “rules” rather than as arguments for giving up 
the consistency checks altogether. An analogy can be made with the interest rate decisions. 
The  inflation  targeting  rules  are  often  interpreted  in  a  flexible  manner  and  many  escape 
clauses are defined to accommodate periods of clearly identifiable, exceptional shocks.   15
I am also far from proposing that compliance with these criteria should automatically (or in 
majority of case) lead to an actual use of interventions. They are rather to be viewed as almost 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions. Additional factors such as constraints on further cuts 
of the interest rates (danger of bubbles, low “substitutability” of the interest rate and exchange 
rate component of the monetary conditions, low sensitivity of exchange rate to interest rates 
changes  in  the  particular  situation,  etc.),  expected  effectiveness  of  interventions  (market 
conditions), and sterilisation costs (section VII) should be considered before  giving up to 
one’s temptations to intervene. As a result, the “interventions reaction function” with respect 
to the variables described in the above consistency criteria is likely to be quite weak and 
unstable, compared with the interest rate reaction function. 
In  the  rest  of  this  section,  I  try  to  apply  the  first  two  criteria  for  assessing  the  Czech 
experience since 1998. The procedural issues are left for section IX. In the first step, let me 
discuss whether the interventions had a direction that was in line with the required changes in 
the overall monetary conditions. Table 3 presents for each intervention period the deviation of 
inflation forecast from the target (ex ante consistency), the actual deviation of inflation from 
target (ex post consistency), the output gap, and the direction of interest rate changes (which 
should reflect the CNB’s overall assessment of the situation, including the risks).   
 
Table 3: Consistency of Interventions with Inflation Targets and Business Cycle 












02-03/1998  +0.5 % - 4.3 % - 1,8 %  ﬁ;›   ? 
06/1998  +0.2 % - 4.3 % - 2.3 %  ﬁ  ? (Y) 
07/1998 - 0.2 % - 4.3 % - 3.3 %  ﬂ  Y 
10/1999 - 0.9 % - 1.5 % - 2.9 %  ﬂ  Y 
12/1999 - 1.4 % - 1.5 % - 2.9 %  ﬂ  Y 
03/2000 - 1.2 % - 1.5 % - 2.2 %  ﬁ  Y 
10/2001  +0.3% - 3.2 % - 0.4 %  ﬁ  ? (Y) 
12/2001 - 0.5 % - 3.2 % - 0.4 %  ﬂ  Y 
01/2002 - 0.9 % - 4.1 % - 0.4 %  ﬂ  Y 
04/2002 - 1.0 % - 3.8 % - 0.9 %  ﬂ  Y 
07-09/2002 
5/  -1.3 % - 3.7 % - 1.5 %  ﬂ  Y 
Source: Czech National Bank; own computations 
Notes: 1/ Deviation of the CNB’s inflation forecast from centre of the target twelve months ahead (for net 
inflation targeting the announced targets closest to the twelve months horizon were used). 2/ Deviation of actual 
inflation after one year (or closest to that) from centre of the target. 3/ Ex post assessment in July 2004 (the 
CNB’s forecasts did not work explicitly with the output gap till July 2002, so no ex ante assessment is available). 
4/ Author’s subjective assessment of the ex ante consistency (ex post consistency given in brackets in indecisive 
cases). 5/ Unconditional inflation forecast, including an explicit assessment of the current output gap.       
 
From the ex ante view, we can see that most interventions against the CZK’s appreciation 
were carried out during periods in which the inflation forecast was pointing below the target 
and the output gap was negative, which is consistent with the logic of inflation targeting. The 
only  exceptions  were  the  interventions  during  the  first  half  of  1998,  when  the  inflation 
forecast was heading towards the upper band of the indicative target for December 1998, and   16
the intervention in October 2001 when the forecast was more or less on target.
17 The output 
gap, though, was negative even in these months. Moreover, in most cases the interventions 
happened  during  periods  of  falling  interest  rates,  which  indicates  that  the  CNB  assessed 
monetary easing to be an appropriate policy response. The period till mid-1998 is again an 
exception in this respect, as the interest rates were in fact increased once during this period. 
Other exceptions are the interventions in early 2000 and October 2001, which fall into the 
relatively long period of stable interest rates. From the ex post view, all the interventions are 
consistent with the logic of inflation targeting, as the actual inflation fell significantly below 
the target, even in those cases when the forecast was on target or above its midpoint. 
On the other hand, we could hardly find periods in which interventions to support the CZK 
would have been target-consistent, as the whole period since 1998 has been characterised by 
subdued economic activity and frequent inflation target undershooting. This addresses the 
question of asymmetry in the CNB’s interventions (see section IV). According to the criteria 
applied here, this asymmetry was in fact consistent with the inflation targeting regime – as the 
conditions  were  asymmetrically  biased  towards  monetary  easing  –  and  does  not  signal  a 
departure from managed floating.    
In the second step, let us have a look at the developments of the monetary conditions mix to 
judge  the  regime  consistency  of  the  interventions.  In  particular,  we  are  asking  if  the 
interventions were carried out in periods of lax interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate 
(or  at  least  in  periods  when  the  situation  was  moving  in  that  direction  quickly).  The 
assessment is made hard by the fact that the ex post judgement on the equilibrium real interest 
rate and exchange rate is often very different from the ex ante assessment, which is however 
not  available  for  most  of  the  analysed  period.  Moreover,  there  is  a  range  of  alternative 
theories to derive the equilibrium trajectories, which may often give contradictory results. For 
this  paper,  I  use  the  ex  post  assessment  by  the  CNB’s  staff  responsible  for  inflation 
forecasting from July 2004 (Beneš and N’Diaye, 2003).
18  
The exchange rate appears to have been overvalued in two periods: in the last three quarters 
of 1998 and from late-2001 till early-2003. At the same time, the real interest rate conditions 
we relaxed in those periods. Therefore, the interventions pass easily the regime consistency 
criterion in these two instances. For the other periods, the judgement is more uncertain.  
In early-1998, the exchange rate was probably close to equilibrium from the ex post view. The 
real  interest  rates  were  still  rather  high,  giving  room  for  easing  through  the  interest  rate 
component  of  monetary  conditions.  There  are  three  possible  explanations  for  using  the 
interventions  instead  in  this  period.  First,  the  exchange  rate  equilibrium  was  assessed 
differently at that time than at present. This is quite possible, taking into account the short 
time that had passed since the turmoil of May-1997 and the still high (even though falling) 
current account deficit. Second, the speed of change in the exchange rate might have been 
viewed as too fast by the CNB, and the interventions could be explained as a pre-emptive 
measure, trying to fight against possible future overvaluation. With a benefit of hindsight, this 
would be a valid argument. Third, the CNB might have been more or less satisfied with the 
overall monetary conditions (as indicated by Table 3), but it also liked its mix and tried to 
prevent it from changing. A preference of restrictive interest rates and depreciated exchange 
rate could have been motivated by a desire to stabilise the current account after the currency 
crisis, and to avoid a spill-over of capital flows volatility from the emerging market crises (see 
also  Holub  and  T￿ma,  2001).  In  other  words,  the  policy  may  have  followed  the  goal  of 
                                                            
17 The forecast in October 2001 was slightly above the centre of targeted corridor in the four-quarter outlook, but 
was heading towards its lower band for the remaining part of the most effective transmission horizon.  
18  This expert assessment, however, should not to be interpreted as an official policy view of the CNB.   17
external  stabilisation,  which  is  perhaps  understandable  for  that  turbulent  period,  but 
questionable in terms of the regime consistency with the inflation targeting. From an ex-post 
point of view, faster interest rate cuts might have been more appropriate in that period.        
In late 1999 and early 2000, the exchange rate appears to have been undervalued in the ex-
post point of view, while the interest rates were restrictive. The ex-post regime consistency of 
the interventions is thus fairly questionable for this period. A possible ex-ante motivation for 
the decision to intervene can be found in the minutes of the Bank Board meeting of October 4, 
1999, which suggest that at that time, the exchange rate’s appreciation against the euro was 
not viewed as a modest correction of the previous marked undervaluation, but as a risk to the 
economic growth and the inflation target. In relation to this, it is important to note that the 
CNB did not use the “gap-methodology” in its forecasting process at that time, which means 
that it was concerned with changes in the exchange rate rather than its deviations from the 
equilibrium.  Another  question  is  why  the  CNB  did  not  use  interest  rate  cuts  rather  than 
interventions to address this risk. The explanation can be again found in the same minutes. 
First, the Board thought that “short-term capital motivated by the interest rate differential was 
not  a  source  of  appreciation  pressure,”  and  that  the  shock  was  coming  from  –  possibly 
exaggerated – market expectations of a future appreciation related to the FDI inflows. Second, 
a  concern  was  expressed  that  the  appreciation  could  be  later  on  replaced  with  a  sharp 
depreciation with negative consequences for the overall stability. Third, the time lag between 
the exchange rate and inflation was believed to be shorter than the transmission of interest 
rates changes. And last, the interest rates were viewed as “in principle consistent with the 
level  achieved  in  the  economic  cycle”,  i.e.  not  restrictive.  Taking  these  arguments  into 
account,  the  judgement  of  the  interventions’  ex  ante  consistency  might  perhaps  be  more 
positive than the ex post assessment.
19 
 
IX. Procedural Issues  
As already mentioned at the beginning of the previous sub-section, the consistency of foreign 
exchange interventions with the inflation targeting regime can also be assessed in terms of 
procedures that are followed in the decision-making process and its public communication. 
After all, the main constraint that the inflation targeting places on the policy makers consists 
in  the  need  to  observe  such  procedural  rules.  An  open  question,  which  the  literature  on 
managed  floating  has  not  addressed  so  far  in  most  cases,  is  to  what  degree  the  same 
procedural principles can – and should – be applied also to foreign exchange interventions 
under the inflation targeting regime.    
Typically,  the  procedures  governing  the  decisions  on  interventions  are  much  less  clearly 
defined than the rules for interest rates. The international standards on the transparency of 
exchange rate management policies are rather vague, compared with other policy areas. On 
the one hand it is argued in favour of clarity on the mandate, rules and procedures for the 
authorities carrying out the interventions. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that “there 
are circumstances in which it would be inappropriate for central bank to disclose their near-
term  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy  implementation  tactics  and  provide  detailed 
                                                            
19 Personally, though, I can still see  some open questions  here. For example, one  may ask  whether  it  was 
appropriate to pay so much attention to the short-run primary effects of the exchange rate changes. Moreover, it 
is not clear if the expectations of future FDIs did not represent a fundamental factor at that time, meaning that the 
appreciation was not a destabilising shock coming from the foreign exchange market. At the same time, the fact 
that  real  interest  rates  were  in  principle  not  viewed  as  restrictive  does  not  in  itself  constitute  a  sufficient 
argument that the interest rates could not have been lowered further. Finally, note that the short-term exchange 
rate volatility does not appear to have been exceptionally high during that period.         18
information  on  foreign  exchange  operations”  (IMF,  1999;  see  also  Chiu,  2003).  The 
international  practice  is  also  quite  diverse,  and  there  are  considerable  differences  in  the 
disclosure  policy  even  among  countries  practising  the  same  exchange  rate  regime  (Chiu, 
2003). The same is true even if one looks on the subset of inflation targeting central banks.  
The lack of clear procedures may be a source of problems, as the credibility of the inflation 
targeting crucially depends on observing its key principles. Therefore, some central banks 
have tried to make the rules for interventions clearer and the decisions more transparent.
20 
Nevertheless, the rules have typically remained fairly general and “discretionary”. As argued 
in Chiu (2003), “the relationship between transparency in monetary policy and that in foreign 
exchange interventions is by no means straightforward”. 
The  difficulty  in  defining  clear  procedures  may  be  partly  connected  to  the  fact  that  the 
economic literature gives no clear guidance in this respect. The inflation targeting literature is 
silent on this issue (see Section II), and the literature on the effectiveness of the interventions 
leads to differing conclusions, based on which channel of their transmission is emphasised. 
Speaking for example about the transparency procedures, if one relies on the signalling effect, 
a logical recommendation would be to carry out open foreign exchange interventions. On the 
other  hand,  if  one  bets  on  the  order  flow  effect,  policy  announcements  may  be 
counterproductive (see Canales-Kriljenko, et al., 2003; Chiu, 2003).  
The lack of transparency and other operational rules may be also justified by the fundamental 
difference in the central banks’ position in the foreign exchange market compared with the 
domestic money market. While in the money market, central banks have an almost perfect 
control over the short-term interest rates, in the foreign exchange market they are only one of 
many players, too weak to lean  against the market. A  central bank  can afford to discuss 
openly the pros and cons of its interest-rate decisions and possibly signal the likely direction 
of its future actions. This does not weaken its impact on the short-end of the yield curve, and 
may only increase – and make more predictable – its impact on longer-term interest rates. On 
the other hand, foreign exchange interventions may be ineffective when anticipated by the 
market, as they may have no further signalling effect or impact on the risk premium. It could 
also  be  strongly  counterproductive  if  the  central  bank  expressed  any  doubts  about  the 
interventions’ effectiveness or appropriateness, as this could weaken their signalling effect. 
Publishing the voting ratios or dissenting views in the real-time thus might be damaging.
21     
Let  me  now  look  at  the  communication  of  foreign  exchange  interventions  in  the  Czech 
Republic. Sometimes, the fact that the CNB was intervening was announced immediately 
(e.g. on 31
st March 1998, 4
th October 1999, 21
st January 2002, or most recently 10
th April 
2002; see Table 4), but on other occasions the CNB carried out “undisclosed” interventions 
(e.g. in December 2001 or in July-September 2002). Discussions of the exchange rate issues 
appeared in the minutes of the regular monetary policy meetings or extraordinary monetary 
policy meetings at which interest-rate decisions were discussed. Only sometimes, however, 
the minutes did also include clear information on interventions. This happened either in the 
case of extraordinary meetings called due to the exchange rate developments (such as on 21
st 
January 2002 or 11
th July 2002) or in the case of some regular meetings (e.g. 4
th October 
1999, 30
th March 2000, and 25
th October 2001). But information on the voting ratio was given 
                                                            
20  The  Sveriges  Riksbank  (2002)  has  been  one  of  the  leaders  in  this  respect.  Chiu  (2003)  argues  that  the 
Canadian system has also become quite transparent in terms of its objectives and openness since 1998, but it has 
not been tested by any actual intervention episode so far. 
21 It might still be possible and advisable, though, to publish the Board discussions with rather a long time lag for 
the sake of accountability.    19
only in some of those cases when the decision was unanimous.
22 The CNB also published its 
agreement with the government, including the alternatives that had been considered; in this 
exceptional case the exchange rate policy was very transparent.  
 






02/1998  04/1998  Open interventions on 31 March announced by a press release (but 
interventions already in February), no minutes 
06/1998  07/1998  Open entry to the market on 14 July; stated in minutes of the 
monetary policy Board meeting of 16 July 
10/1999  10/1999  Open interventions on 4 October, published in minutes (detailed 
explanation; unanimous voting) 
12/1999  12/1999  Minutes only mention a consensus view on the necessity to prevent 
excessive appreciation (+warning against interventions was given 
already in November)  
03/2000  03/2000  Open interventions on 30 March, announced by press release, 
published in minutes (unanimous decision) 
10/2001  01/2002  25 October: regular MP meeting, decision to intervene published in 
minutes (unanimous); 20 December: regular meeting, interventions 
discussed, but no decision announced; 21 January 2002: 
extraordinary meeting, interventions announced and published in 
separate minutes (unanimous decision) 
04/2002  04/2002  4 April: extraordinary MP meeting, interventions announced by 
press release; 10 April: interventions with a press release 
07/2002  09/2002  11 July: extraordinary meeting, no decisions announced 
immediately, minutes include decision on interventions (no voting 
ratio); subsequent interventions not disclosed directly  
 
The monthly volume of interventions is published with a lag of two months (since July 1998), 
which  is  the  main  regular  channel  for  communicating  the  interventions.  As  reported  by 
Canales-Kriljenko  (2003),  interventions  volumes  are  published  only  by  25  percent  of  all 
central banks that responded to a survey’s questions concerning the transparency  of their 
interventions  policy.  This  means  that  the  CNB  belongs  to  the  minority  group  of  more 
transparent  central  banks  in  this  respect  (even  though  some  other  banks  publish  daily 
intervention volumes, which is a step further in transparency). It can be thus concluded that 
some  minimal  communication  standards  are  in  place  concerning  the  CNB’s  decisions  on 
foreign exchange interventions, but a considerable degree of discretion remains in this area, 
unlike for the interest-rate decisions. 
Other institutional aspects of interventions also differ from the interest-rate decisions. While 
the interest rates are adjusted based on comparing the inflation forecast with the targets in a 
pre-specified time horizon (and taking into account a list of escape clauses), no such clear 
rules exist for the interventions. No sufficiently clear written opinion has been explicitly given 
– either externally or at least internally – under what circumstances are the foreign exchange 
                                                            
22 In mid-2001, the CNB’s Board decided to publish full transcripts of its monetary policy meetings with a lag of 
six years. This means that the details of the interventions’ debates from these meetings will also become public. 
Nevertheless, the transcripts are produced from those meetings only at which interest rate changes are discussed.    20
interventions  consistent  with  the  current  policy  regime.
23  In  contrast  with  the  Situational 
Reports  used  at  the  regular  monetary  policy  meeting  to  decide  on  the  interest  rates,  no 
standardised material for the Board’s discussions on interventions exists, etc. All of this may 
sometimes create challenging tensions in the monetary policy regime.  
These  challenges  are,  in  my  opinion,  a  strong  argument  for  the  central  banks  pursuing 
inflation  targeting  in  the  less  open  economies  to  avoid  using  the  foreign  exchange 
interventions altogether and let the currency float freely. In very open economies, however, it 
is not clear whether the central banks can afford to do this just due to procedural consistency 
and related credibility reasons. In their case, the decisions on the frequency of interventions 
thus needs to take into account other factors as well, such as their effectiveness, sterilisation 
costs, etc. (see above). Once the central bank decides to use the interventions, however, it 
should set at least some minimal rules and procedural steps to make the interventions more 
transparent, which should include a clearer definition of the interventions’ consistency with 
the  policy  regime  and  their  public  communication  strategy.  An  open  communication  of 
dissenting views on the interventions, though, should not be a part of this communication 
strategy, in my opinion, as it could weaken their effectiveness (if there is any at all).      
  
                                                            
23 Spoken opinion is  given to the Bank Board by the Financial  markets department on the  motivations for 
interventions and the prevailing market conditions. Typically, the motivation was described as creating two-way 
risk in the situations of one-sided market expectations. While not in conflict with my suggestions, I believe that 
this mechanism is not sufficiently systematic.      21
V. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, I discussed the role of foreign exchange interventions in the inflation-targeting 
regime, concentrating on the Czech experience since 1998.  
I  stressed  that  the  inflation  targeting  literature  gives  little  guidance  on  how  to  use  the 
interventions  under  this  regime.  The  theory  usually  assumes  –  and  often  explicitly 
recommends – pure floating under which the central bank influences the exchange rate via the 
interest rates only.  If we assume perfect  capital mobility, there are few channels through 
which the interventions could have a systematic and predictable impact on the exchange rate. 
However,  there  is  also  an  alternative  view,  proposing  that  small  open  economies  can 
successfully combine the inflation targeting with managed floating. 
Since May 1997, the Czech Republic has operated a managed floating exchange rate with the 
euro (previously the DEM) serving as a reference currency. In line with that, the CNB has 
intervened occasionally in the foreign exchange market. With the exception of the year 1997, 
the  interventions  were  directed  against  the  CZK’s  appreciation  only.  The  periods  of 
intervention activity included December 1997 to July 1998, October 1999 to March 2000, and 
the period from late-2001 till September 2002.  
Moreover, a special account for the government’s foreign exchange privatisation revenues 
was established at the CNB in early-2000, and strengthened by an agreement between the 
CNB and the government in January 2002. This agreement has kept all the government’s 
foreign exchange revenues out of the market and at the same time allowed the government to 
finance its fiscal needs out of the privatisation revenues. So far, the CNB has purchased over 
EUR  4.2  billion  directly  from  the  state.  The  agreement  includes  the  government’s 
participation on sterilisation costs of the CNB due to these direct purchases.  
The  stylised  facts  do  not  give  any  clear  answer  concerning  the  effectiveness  of  the 
interventions. It seems that sometimes they might have had an immediate impact, lasting up to 
2 or 3 months. However, no particular “ideal” intervention strategy can be identified at first 
sight.  Something  that  did  work  in  one  situation  may  have  little  effect  in  another  one. 
Moreover,  even  many  of  the  “successful”  interventions  were  not  able  to  prevent  quite 
prolonged periods of exchange rate overvaluation in 1998 and in 2002. The initial impact of 
the  CNB’s  agreement  with  the  government  was  also  disappointing.  Nevertheless,  the 
undisclosed interventions that the CNB used in July-September 2002 (together roughly EUR 
1 billion) seem to have had an important effect thanks to a combination of several factors, a 
change in the market expectations being probably the most important of these. And to the 
extent that the policy measures contributed to these changed expectations, one could say that 
they had a medium-term impact on the exchange rate. In sum, the experience so far seems to 
favour a signalling role of foreign exchange interventions, which however implies a rather 
unstable transmission between the central bank actions and the market reactions. The strategy 
that worked in the second half of 2002, for example, cannot be thought of as a universal 
effective recipe for any future turbulent period.  
An important aspect of the interventions that must not be overlooked is the sterilisation costs. 
I have shown that these have indeed had a strong empirical relevance in the Czech Republic. 
Their total sum since 1993 has reached 8-10 % of the yearly GDP, partly as a heritage of the 
fixed exchange rate regime till May-1997 and partly due to the interventions under floating. 
The sterilisation costs had a negative impact on the interventions’ credibility and effectiveness 
till  2002,  when  the  interest-rate  differential  vis-à-vis  eurozone  became  negative  and  the 
interventions started to be viewed as profitable by the market.   22
To judge whether the foreign exchange interventions are not in a strong conflict with the 
inflation targeting regime, I propose three basic criteria, which look at the consistency of the 
interventions with the inflation targets (target consistency), at the mix of monetary conditions 
(regime  consistency)  and  the  clarity  and  transparency  of  decision  making  (procedural 
transparency). In my opinion, central banks that want to use foreign exchange interventions as 
part of the inflation targeting regime should define and communicate such criteria of their 
target and regime consistency, even if these criteria should be used as “flexible rules” for the 
interventions allowing for possible escape clauses. It also needs to be stressed that the criteria 
must be viewed as necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the actual use of interventions.   
Using the proposed criteria to assess the CNB’s interventions, I found out that they can be all 
judged as ex-post target-consistent, as the whole period since 1998 has been characterised by 
frequent target undershooting, negative output gap and falling interest rates. From the ex-ante 
perspective, the judgement is less clear for the interventions in early-1998, when the inflation 
was expected to be in the upper half of the targeted interval, and in October 2001, when the 
inflation forecast was on target. In these periods, however, the interventions could be justified 
at least by a negative output gap. 
The monetary conditions mix was consistent with the proposed criteria in mid-1998 and from 
late-2001 till 2002. The combination of restrictive interest rate conditions and loose exchange 
rate conditions in early-1998 suggests that the CNB might have followed the goal of external 
stabilisation besides the inflation target, which is understandable for the given circumstances, 
but questionable in terms of consistency with the newly introduced inflation targeting regime. 
Similar questions arise also about the interventions in late 1999 and early-2000, as there is no 
reliable evidence of an exchange rate overvaluation for that period.  
An issue that has been often overlooked by the literature on managed floating is the difficulty 
in defining clear procedural rules for the foreign exchange interventions. This may be quite 
important, though, when managed floating is combined with the inflation targeting regime. 
The  lack  of  clear  rules  and  transparency  typically  surrounding  the  foreign  exchange 
interventions contrasts with the clearly defined procedures guiding the interest rate decisions, 
which may occasionally create tensions in the monetary policy regime. The Czech experience 
has been in line with this general conclusion.  
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